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ABSTRACT 
The paper aims to show how and to what extent social and cultural cues 
influence figurative language understanding. In the first part of the 
paper, we argue that social-contextual knowledge is organized in 
“schemas” or stereotypes, which act as strong bias in speaker’s meaning 
comprehension. Research in Experimental Pragmatics has shown that 
age, gender, race and occupation stereotypes are important contextual 
sources of information to interpret others’ speech and provide an 
explanation of their behavior. In the second part of the paper, we focus 
on gender stereotypes and their influence on the comprehension of 
figurative language, to show how the social functions of figurative 
language are modulated by gender stereotypes. We provide then an 
explanation of gender stereotypical bias on figurative language in terms 
of possible outcomes in the social context.  
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I. Socio-cultural Influences on Figurative Language Understanding 
Every time we play with words, we have a certain audience in mind. If we do not 
know very well our audience, or we run the risk to be misinterpreted, or we 
choose to stay anchored to the literal meaning of conventional expressions. 
Figurative language comprehension seems to require “something more” than 
the knowledge of conventional meaning of utterances. Non-literal language, 
such as simile, metaphor, metonymy, irony, etc., requires the understanding 
that what the speaker literally says is different from what she intends to convey, 
which concerns the pragmatic field. Traditionally, Pragmatics has been 
relegated to a secondary role by Chomskyan linguistics, interested in grammar 
as a context-free device of the Faculty of language. On this view, language is a 
cognitive mechanism totally autonomous and separate from other cognitive 
functions. By contrast, Modern Pragmatics has instead paid attention to 
contextual cues on the interpretation of the “speaker’s meaning”, i.e. the 
intention to mean something different from the conventional meaning of 
speaker’s utterance. In this sense, Pragmatics has abandoned Chomskyan 
solipsistic view of the Faculty of language, and it has privileged the mentalistic 
aspect of intention comprehension over other belief structures which influence 
how we communicate to other people. More precisely, these beliefs structures 
concern social and cultural aspects of our everyday lives. 
As Katz pointed out, «despite their seeming centrality, the history of 
linguistics and psycholinguistics has evolved to marginalize, and even ignore, 
social and cultural factors» (Katz, 2005, p. ix). However, recent trends in 
research in Pragmatics have been brought to scholars’ attention a number of 
social and cultural cues to figurative language comprehension, such as gender, 
ethnicity, socio-geographic origin, personality traits, socio-economic status, 
occupation, social power, political background, relationships of familiarity or 
friendship, etc. (Colston & Katz, 2005). According to this view, social and 
cultural aspects strongly influence the way human beings communicate. 
Figurative language understanding is indeed a complex interactive system 
which «even at the earliest moments of production and comprehension, 
simultaneously evaluates and integrates knowledge of linguistic structure – 
that is, how language is used and the socio-cultural factors of relevance» (Katz, 
2005, p. x). Therefore, figurative language, being so context-dependent, is the 
best “tribunal of experience” for testing the structures of social and cultural 
knowledge people own.  
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As Lippman wrote, we tend to use social stereotypes to categorize people in 
different social groups and compare them to better understand the social world 
(Lippman, 1922). Social stereotypes are identified according to what we 
consider the “same nature” people belonging to a social group share, i.e. the 
particular pattern of characteristics or traits perceived as similar in members of 
a certain group. This could be explained as a natural tendency to draw and 
stock information about others on the basis of their (perceived) similarities in 
order to predict their behavior and communicate with them. In this paper, we 
aim at showing how and to what extent, social stereotypes modulate linguistic 
behavior understanding. 
In philosophy of language, stereotypes have been described as “negative” 
when a-critically applied to individual traits departing from the social 
stereotype and used then as a prejudice which leads to misunderstand others’ 
behavior. For instance, the stereotype of race based on the color of the skin 
could become a prejudice when used to dichotomically divide people into 
categories of “good” (e.g. white skin) and “bad” (e.g. black skin) in order to 
judge their behavior. From this perspective, stereotypes could produce a “false 
consciousness” and become troublesome because the judgments entailed 
could lead to misleading caricatures of “out-groups”. However, they could also 
be “positive” bias in case we use them as simple categories for understanding 
others’ behavior. According to Gadamer (1960), for instance, the interpreter 
never begins the interpretation with a state of mind similar to a tabula rasa, but 
always with some expectations, some pre-judgement, from which a first 
interpretative project arises. A good interpreter must continually test her 
interpretation to make her hypotheses more adequate, changing them when 
they do not find confirmations. In a similar vein, in analytic philosophy, 
Davidson wrote that the interpreter begins the interpretation with some 
expectations expressed by a “prior theory” (Davidson, 1986). During the 
interpretative process, the prior theory is modified and adjusted to be adapted 
to the speaker’s intentions. An interpreter should interpret the speaker’s 
utterances according to holistic criteria: the meaning she gives to a single word 
depends on the meaning of the whole sentence where it is inserted, and the 
meaning of a single sentence can be understood only inside the language used 
by a linguistic community in a social context.  
In social psychology, stereotypes are usually conceived as generalizations 
or descriptive simplified categories people use to classify social groups and 
their individual members. From a social-psychological perspective, stereotypes 
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could be considered cognitive shortcuts we use to reduce the complexity of our 
everyday social world: when activated, people are judged in terms of the 
group’s standards (Dovidio, 1999). In other words, stereotypes would be 
energy-saving devices associated with an unintentional and unconscious 
process (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). 
Indeed, they seem to be automatically activated, especially for some 
fundamental categories such as those of age, gender and race (Lepore & 
Brown, 1997).  
The effect of activating stereotypes on interpretations of subsequent 
information in a stereotype-consistent direction is well documented. 
Stereotypes shape interpretations and influence how information is recalled: 
people do recall information better and more readily when it is consistent with 
a preexisting stereotype than when it is inconsistent with it (Bodenhausen, 
1988). Stereotypes guide expectations, inferences and impressions when 
people are not motivated to inhibit them and require a greater effort to be 
overcome (Devine, 1989; Kunda, 1999). However, as far as they are cultural 
products, they can also be modified. Some studies have shown that the 
exposition to other cultures could change individual stereotypes (Pepitone, 
1986), while other studies have demonstrated that individual stereotypes 
could get softer according to exposition times and conscious reflection on their 
content. Studies on immigrant populations have shown that the longer 
someone from another culture has lived in their adoptive home, the more she 
will come to hold the values of the new social context (Hewstone, 1996): for 
instance, Chung & Fisher (2001) study on Chinese immigrants in Canada 
shows that their consumption stereotypes vary according to the exposure to 
foreign consumption behaviors and values. Other studies on stereotype change 
and prejudice reduction have pointed out that a significant increase in 
knowledge corresponds to a significant decrease in negative stereotyping. 
However, Hill & Augoustinos (2001) showed that education programs aimed 
at reducing prejudices towards Aboriginal Australians, hardly changed the 
existents stereotypes, even thought they could entail a decrease in old-fashion 
racism, when applied in “real world” context. At any rate, cross-cultural 
research has proved to be fundamental to specify the shared contextual basis of 
social cognition which cannot be comprehended by the classic “automatic 
processes” theory. 
II. Social Stereotypes and Non-literal Language 
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It has been argued that social stereotypes could be considered as cognitive 
structures (or schemas) which contain large networks of abstract information 
about traits, attributes and expected behaviors of members of a particular 
social group (Blumentritt & Heredia, 2005). These “social schemas” are a 
particular class of semantic associations: stereotypes are indeed composed by a 
set of semantically related concepts, which are frequently associated. A concept 
is more easily recalled by another concept when they are stereotypically 
related. As a wide literature testifies (see for a review Devine, 1989 and 
Dovidio, 1999), semantic priming, i.e. the exposure to a semantic stimulus 
influencing the response to a later semantic stimulus, is indeed the most 
important method used in the experimental study of stereotypes activation. 
Stereotype priming effect is usually activated by an implicit association test 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005): each 
participant is presented with a list of semantic categories and some common 
trait features, and is asked to associate the target traits with the categories 
presented. The activation of stereotypes has been shown through participants’ 
faster responses to traits stereotypically consistent with the prime category 
(e.g. White-anglosaxon) than to traits stereotypically inconsistent with the 
prime category (e.g. White-musical) (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986).  
This series of experimental studies have shown that language itself is a 
vehicle of social stereotypes, at the extent that it is difficult to imagine a natural 
language as free from stereotypes (Maas & Arcuri, 1996). Blumentritt and 
Heredia (2005) analyze how and to what extent stereotypes influence on 
behaviour, memory, social judgment and attitudes. In particular, they focus on 
the relationship between stereotypes and language processing and they 
suggest that «stereotypes can be construed as a special case of figurative 
language.» (Blumentritt & Heredia, 2005, p. 262) Because of their implicit 
structure of semantically related concepts, they are indeed important 
contextual cues to non-literal language understanding.  
According to some researchers on social stereotypical categorization and 
non-literal language comprehension, social stereotypes – like speaker’s 
gender, ethnic group and occupation – are found to be powerful bias on non-
literal language interpretation. For instance, gender stereotypes are found to 
be a social constraint which comes into play very early in the process of sarcasm 
comprehension (Garnham, Oakhill, & Reynolds, 2002). Similar results have 
been found for ethnic (Heredia & Blumentritt, 2002) and occupation 
stereotypes (Pexman & Olineck, 2002a). In particular, Katz and Pexman 
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inserted speakers’ occupation in the context of ironic utterance, both because 
«occupation is an indicator of the speaker’s social status» and «also a variable 
that conveys the speaker’s social knowledge» (Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 
2000, p. 203).  
Indeed, speaker’s occupation has been shown to influence not only the 
interpretation of figurative meaning in general, but also the interpretation of 
ironic intention in particular (Katz & Lee 1993). The above mentioned studies 
on speaker’s occupation, as a cue to either ironic or metaphoric interpretation 
(Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 2000), Pexman and 
Olineck (2002a), suggest that «people shared beliefs about the linguistic 
tendencies of different social groups and that those beliefs influence perceived 
communicative intent» (Pexman & Olineck, 2002a, p. 270). Katz, Blasko and 
Kazmerski have forcefully shown that the emergence of sarcasm is produced by 
a character in the context making a statement incongruent with events in the 
story (Katz, Blasko, & Kazmerski 2004). Multiple sources of information are 
conjointly exploited when a listener attempts to understand an ironic utterance 
and also social-stereotypical categorization contributes to comprehension 
process. As it is argued in Pexman and Olineck (2002a), these results could be 
correlated with the specific traits of speaker occupation activated in irony 
interpretation or their perceived tendencies to be more humorous, to mock or 
criticize, to be less sincere and to have a lower occupation level, but also to be 
more polite and positive in case of ironic insults, the most spread form of 
sarcasm (Pexman & Olineck, 2002b). As we will see in the next section, 
occupation stereotypes influence metaphor interpretation as well. 
III. The Role of Gender in Figurative Language Comprehension 
Social factors such as occupation, race and gender stereotypes play an 
important role in understanding figures of speech, such as metaphor and irony. 
An example of the influence of occupation stereotypes is the following 
sentence: (1) “Be careful James, those sharks will tell you one thing today and 
tomorrow say something completely different”, which represents a type of 
figurative language known as metaphoric reference (Gibbs, 1990; Onishi & 
Murphy, 1993; Stewart & Heredia, 2002). In this sentence, the term “sharks” 
is clearly not describing a marine animal: instead, it depicts the idea that 
lawyers are bad and cunning. It contrasts with predicate metaphor of the form 
“A is a B” (e.g., “Lawyers are sharks”), where metaphor consists of a topic 
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(e.g., “lawyers”) and a vehicle (e.g. “sharks”). In sentences such as (1), the 
vehicle is usually explicit, and the listener must infer the topic from the 
previous context. Indeed, to understand the sentence (1), information relevant 
to the topic must come before the metaphoric reference, otherwise it would be 
difficult to make sense of the sentence. Studies by Gibbs (1990) and Onishi 
and Murphy (1993) have shown that reading times are longer for metaphor 
than literal understanding and that it is more difficult to understand 
metaphoric than literal referential descriptions, because multiple sources of 
information have to be integrated in the comprehension process. Therefore, 
comprehension of non-literal reference cannot be as effortless as 
understanding comparable literal reference (Onishi & Murphy, 1993).  
Occupation stereotypes are anyway less powerful in biasing non-literal 
language when compared to gender stereotypes. In this sections, we focus on 
gender stereotypes which seem to be more “basic” and influential and to 
appear very early in child cognitive development (Bemdt & Heller, 1986). 
Gender stereotypes have been well documented in the literature on irony. For 
instance, according to Raymond Gibbs (2000), men are prone to make 
sarcastic remarks almost twice as often as women and are more likely to use 
sarcastic irony in conversation with friends. In particular, as Jorgensen (1996) 
points out, there are gender differences in emotional reactions to verbal irony: 
men were more likely than women to perceive humor in sarcastic irony; on the 
contrary, women were more likely than men to be offended by sarcastic 
utterances. Therefore, gender might be one of the more evident stereotypical 
differences related to verbal irony production and interpretation.  
Unlike, gender differences have received very little research attention in the 
literature on teasing, with contrasting results. A contribution is given by 
Lampert’s research (1996): taking irony as a form of teasing, he reports that 
men were more likely to tease than women. By contrast, Keltner et al. (2001) 
argue that there is no evidence of gender differences in the style or behavior of 
teasing. Katz, Piasecka, & Toplak (2001) have investigated whether gender, as 
a social category, could suggest a speaker’s tendency to make ironic remarks. 
In the light of their data, men are perceived to be more sarcastic than women. 
Interestingly, speaker’s gender and addressee’s gender were processed exactly 
when participants (adults and children) read the last word in the sarcastic 
comment (Pexman et al., 2000), suggesting that participants needed to 
integrate speaker’s gender to fully understand it. 
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Another salient trait might be captured by conversational indirectness. 
Holtgraves (2005) found gender differences in production and 
comprehension of indirect requests. An example of this form of implicit speech 
is the following sentence: “It’s cold in here”, said as a request for someone to 
close the door. He also ideated and validated the “Conversational Indirectness 
Scale” (CIS) «to measure the extent to which individuals differ in their 
tendencies to express themselves indirectly and understand indirect meanings» 
(Pexman, 2005, p. 221). The participants rated their own tendencies to speak 
sarcastically in general and in specific contexts. According to the results, there 
is a significant gender difference: male participants gave higher self-reports of 
sarcasm use than female participants.  
Gender differences emerge also in the use of asyndeton. Asyndeton is a 
form of indirect speech in which the speaker uses a minimal scheme, where 
conjunctions are omitted, to change the rhythm of the utterance and to imply a 
great deal more than what is said. An example of this kind of utterance is the 
following: “I go, I work, I leave”. According to the data collected from six 
experiments conducted by Colston and Lusch (2004), asyndeton is considered 
a more male-like than female-like form of communication. In particular, men 
use it as often as direct negative commentary, whereas women use it less often 
than direct negative remarks. Both men and women reported that asyndeton 
poses more of a risk for misinterpretation than literal remarks do. Perhaps, 
men use asyndeton more often than women because its pragmatic functions (to 
be unconventional and to be humorous) particularly suit men’s discourse aims 
and because the risk of misunderstanding inherent in asyndeton appeals to 
men’s greater riskiness.  
IV. Making Sense of Gender Stereotypes in Language Use 
Gender stereotypes seem to be one of the most influential cues on figurative 
language comprehension. As previously reported, gender differences have 
been found especially in the use and interpretation of irony and sarcasm. 
Colston and Lee (2004) tried to evaluate whether and why gender differences 
would be found in people’s use of verbal irony, and found that this rhetorical 
figure is considered a more male-like than female-like form of communication 
by both men and women. To explain this result, they hypothesized that verbal 
irony, being an indirect form of language, might entail a greater risk of 
misinterpretation compared with more direct forms of speech. According to 
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this hypothesis, male speakers would be more prone to take this risk than 
female speakers, because men are generally more risky than women in a variety 
of social activities: a “better-recognized” social status could give them a 
greater willingness to risk (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Wiederman, 
1997). 
The social effect of figurative language could explain why people use this 
more “expensive” and risky way of communicating. Indeed, other studies 
showed that verbal irony enables the speakers to perform a variety of pragmatic 
functions (Roberts & Kreuz, 1995; Lee & Katz, 1998), including to be 
humorous, to express surprise or mastery over some topic or issue, to diminish 
or to enhance criticism, to point out a deviance from expectations, to display 
negative emotions. It is also well documented that ironic comments is thought 
to be rude, to de-emphasize and to insult to a greater extent than literal 
comments (Colston & Lee, 2000, and 2004).  
The social functions of verbal irony are more employed by female than male 
participants. On the contrary, the functions of irony used to enhance negativity 
and be humorous are equally employed by male and female participants. There 
are gender differences, for instance, in how people attribute blame for a failure. 
In general, men are more prone to blame the situation or their addressee for 
failures. Instead, women are more likely to make personal attributions for 
failures: this could be the reason why women are slightly less likely to use 
verbal irony. One hypothesis of this behaviour suggests that women usually 
tend to avoid ways of speaking which present higher risk of misunderstanding 
and to be slightly less likely to use verbal irony, because a quite common female 
behaviour is to blame themselves for a misunderstanding in a conversational 
exchange. As verbal irony may be considered a more aggressive form of talking 
than literal commentary; more critical and condemning than literally negative 
remarks, they would try to avoid as much as possible a social negative feedback. 
According to Lampert (1996), male and female subjects also have different 
reasons for using self-direct humor. Men tend to use sarcasm when it would 
decrease vulnerability, while women use sarcasm to increase social 
vulnerability and promote intimacy. In sarcasm ratings for ironic compliments, 
women tend to perceive this kind of compliment as more sarcastic than men. 
To explain this result, a hypothesis might be that women rate ironic 
compliments as less polite than men do, because sarcasm would have a negative 
connotation in this sense (Dews & Winner, 1995; Pexman & Olineck, 
2002a).  
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These findings tell us something about why and whether a social and 
cultural cue, such as gender, has an effect on non-literal language use. 
Figurative language, more than literal one, is human beings’ way to express 
what is “unsaid” and implicit in communication. This “unsaid” depends on a 
background of tacitly shared social conventions and everyday practices, which 
allow people to understand the implicit part of their communicative exchanges. 
This tacitly shared background is shaped by more fundamental social and 
cultural phenomena related to social stereotyping and basic cues such as 
gender. The ways non-literal communication is influenced by gender 
stereotypes reveal this tacitly shared background of human communities, 
complete with their subtle differences. 
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